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COMMENTS
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY - ITS APPLICATION
AND MEANING
by Gerald W. Ostarch
A consumer injured by using a defective product has a number of reme-
dies available for recovery against the manufacturer, the wholesaler or the
seller despite the fact that no one expressly warranted the fitness of the
product. The remedies are generally grouped under two headings, a tort
action based upon negligence or a suit upon an implied warranty.
In Texas three theories of warranty are available in addition to the
tort action. All are called "implied warranty," although they are in fact
very different from one another. The oldest of the three is an implied
contractual warranty running from the seller of a product to his buyer.
Privity of contract between these two parties is a necessary prerequisite
for a suit.' The second theory is tortious in nature and based upon public
policy. Like the implied contractual remedy this method has developed
by the common law process, but unlike the contractual remedy privity
is not required. The third and latest theory arises from article two of the
Uniform Commercial Code,' dealing with sales.' This code remedy sup-
plants the older implied contractual warranty and more definitely de-
fines the limits of its application. The latter two theories, implied war-
ranty developed by a common law process and implied warranty under
the Code, embody the developing concept of strict liability. The purpose
of this Comment is to explore the development and meaning of these two
doctrines.
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY
In 1942 the Texas Supreme Court in Decker & Sons v. Capps4 held that
an injured person could recover for personal injuries in a contaminated
food consumption case without showing privity of contract between the
parties or negligence on the part of the manufacturer. The court held
that "the broad principle of the public policy to protect life and health"'
creates "an implied warranty imposed by operation of law."' Significantly,
the court distinguished this type of implied warranty from the older
contractual variety by stating: "While a right of action in such a case
'Cruz v. Ansul Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; Brown
v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e. The Cruz and Brown cases
are modified in part by the refusal of the application for writ of error in O.M. Franklin Serum Co.
v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 10 Tex. S. Ct. J. 525 (July 19, 1967). See also Donelson v. Fairmont
Foods Co., 252 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; Baylor v. Eastern Seed Co.,
191 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
2 The Code became effective at midnight, June 30, 1966.
aTex. Laws (1967) ch. 785.
4139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).5 Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
° Id.
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is said to spring from a 'warranty' it should be noted that the warranty
here referred to is not the ...contractual warranty, but is an obligation
imposed by law to protect public health."7 This type of implied warranty
imposed a strict liability upon the manufacturer, thereby absolving the
plaintiff from the requirement of proving privity of contract between him-
self and the manufacturer and from the duty of proving that the manu-
facturer had been negligent.8 Thus, an entirely new theory of recovery
was created in Decker.
The implied warranty doctrine, imposing strict liability as to contami-
nated food for human consumption, has been followed in subsequent de-
cisions rendered by Texas courts of civil appeals.! The doctrine has been
extended to apply to contaminated food for animals"° and to drugs for
human use." However, in the absence of a precedent by the supreme,
court, courts of civil appeals demonstrated a strong reluctance to extend
the Decker rule to non-food products other than drugs.'" In such in-
stances it was necessary that a plaintiff plead and prove negligence of
the manufacturer in order to sue in tort or that he demonstrate that
privity existed in order to predicate the suit upon an implied contractual
warranty.
Attempts have been made to extend the Decker doctrine against others
Id. at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 831.
'Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
800-05 (1966); Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 9-11 (1965); see text
accompanying notes 97-132 infra.
9F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.;
Alexander v. Davis, 383 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.; Athens Canning
Co. v. Ba.llard, 365 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d
821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Caddo Grocery & Ice v. Carpenter, 285 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955); Brumit v. Cokins, 281 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.;
Sweeney v. Cain, 243 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Loudder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Burgess, 195
S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Enas, 164 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. CiV. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m. The Decker rule has been cited in cases other
than those involving personal injury. See, e.g., Bob's Candy & Pecan Co. v. McConnell, 140 Tex.
331, 167 S.W.2d 511 (1943); Figaro Chem. Co. v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 271 S.W.2d 838
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
10O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 410 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966
error ref.; McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e. (turkey feed); Burrus Feed MiLls, Inc. v. Reeder, 391 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(horse feed); International Milling Co. v. Jernigan, 191 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (plea
of privilege case) (livestock feed); cf. the old case of A. Piper Co. v. Oppenheimer, 158 S.W.
777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
'1Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref.
n.r.e., cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
""We feel unauthorized on the basis of the Decker case to recognize a further exception
to the general rule and impose liability in this case absent privity of contract." Cruz v. Ansul
Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (fire extinguisher).
See also Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), reVd, 416
S.W.2d 787 (1967); Copetillo v. Crosby County Fuel Assoc., 407 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
(cattle spray); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (ex-
ploding bottle); Latham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 175 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
(exploding bottle); Jax Beer Co. v. Shaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
w.o.m. (exploding bottle). See generally Bateman, Products Liability, 27 TEx. B.J. 9 (1964);
Cruse, Products Liability-Past, Present and Future, 8 S. TEx. L.J. 151 (1966); Jones, Products
Liability, 29 TEX. B.J. 241 (1966); Comment, Implied Warranty: Let's Abandon Privity, 16
BAYLOR L. REV. 263 (1964).
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than the original manufacturer. In Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey" the
supreme court held that the doctrine of implied warranty could also be
applied to a retailer of contaminated food "even though such food is in
sealed containers bearing the label of the manufacturer."' 4 But, in a later
case, Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines," the supreme court refused to apply
the doctrine against a wholesaler who dealt with foods in original pack-
ages put up by a manufacturer. The court indicated hostility towards its
holding in Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey. However, the issue of extending
the strict liability of Decker against a retailer was not before the court;-
therefore, the case did not overrule the Josey decision. The result was that
a retailer could be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from a de-
fective product which he sold, but a wholesaler could not be, provided he
had no chance to alter the product while it was in his hands.
In the landmark case of Putman v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 7
the Fifth Circuit in 1964 made "an Erie-educated guess"'" as to what
Texas state courts would hold, and extended the Decker doctrine to the
assembler of a wheelchair. The court held the assembler strictly liable for
injuries resulting to a user because a component part was defective and
rendered the entire product unreasonably dangerous. Likewise, the manu-
facturer of the defective component part was held strictly liable. Follow-
ing the Putman case, a federal district court sitting in Texas held that a
defective aluminum foil pie pan was an unreasonably dangerous instrumen-
tality; the manufacturer was held strictly liable for resulting injuries."
Most Texas courts of civil appeals, however, refused to follow the lead of
the Fifth Circuit. Several recent cases maintained the marked distinction
between contaminated food cases and those involving other products. For
example, in Cruz v. Ansul Chemical Co.' the court held, notwithstanding
Putman, that strict liability (implied warranty) was inapplicable when
a defective fire extinguisher was involved. In Copetillo v. Crosby County
Fuel Assoc.," the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals held that the theory of
implied warranty was not applicable in a non-food case brought against a
middleman, i.e., a wholesaler or retailer.
This trend was interrupted when two intermediate appellate courts
rendered conflicting decisions, one following the traditional approach and
"3139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
14 Id. at 634, 164 S.W.2d at 840.
5151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
s6See concurring opinion of Justice Wilson. Id. at 372, 251 S.W.2d at 168.
1338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 198 (1965).
'"Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Several federal district courts applying Texas
law had already extended the Decker reasoning to cases involving non-food products. Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (federal court in New York applying
Texas law via New York's conflicts of law rule); Bowerman v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
105 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Tex. 1952).
"Crusan v. Aluminum Co. of America, 250 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Tex. 1965), noted in 20
Sw. L.J. 945 (1966).
20399 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e., modified in part by the refusal
of the appliction for writ of error in O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 10 Tex.
S. Ct. J. 525 (July 19, 1967). Contra, Ford Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) (plea of privilege case extending implied warranty to a non-food product).
2407 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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the other extending the Decker doctrine of strict liability to a non-food
case. In Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. McKisson"2 the plaintiff's wife, a beauty
parlor owner, suffered loss of hair and severe scalp burns when a perma-
nent wave lotion was applied to her bleached hair. Her husband sued the
distributor of the product. The jury found that the lotion was not
reasonably fit for use as a permanent wave preparation and that the use
of such lotion proximately caused the injuries, but also found that a
reasonably prudent beauty operator in the exercise of ordinary care would
have known that the product should not be applied to bleached hair. The
trial court held for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals reversed the
lower court, stating that privity was necessary since the doctrine of im-
plied warranty had no application when dealing with a non-food product,
and that contributory negligence was a complete defense in such a suit. "
In the meantime, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals had rendered a
contrary decision in Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks."4 There the
plaintiff's son was injured by an explosion when, pursuant to instruction
of another, the son poured kerosene on a smoldering stick which he had
taken from an incinerator. The kerosene, allegedly adulterated by addition
of gasoline, had a flash point lower than that required by statute.' The
plaintiff sued the retailer, the distributor, and the manufacturer of the
kerosene, alleging that the defendants had breached an implied warranty
that the product was suitable for normal usage. The plaintiff offered evi-
dence showing that kerosene meeting the statutory standards would not
have exploded. The jury found that the plaintiff's son was contributorily
negligent but was unable to agree on answers to other material issues.
The judge instructed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer and declared
a mistrial as to the other defendants. The defendants filed an original
proceeding for mandamus in the court of civil appeals to require the trial
court to enter a judgment.
The court of civil appeals denied the mandamus and held that privity
between opposing parties was unnecessary; that contributory negligence
was not a defense in an implied warranty situation; and that the doctrine
of implied warranty could be applied against a distributor. This decision
represented a conspicuous departure from the steadfast position of most
Texas courts in refusing to extend the Decker rule to non-food products. "
The supreme court, speaking through Justice Norvell, resolved the con-
flict between Tunks and McKisson. In both instances the court applied the
doctrine of strict liability to a non-food case.2" In Tunks, contributory
negligence, i.e., the failure of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care, was
22408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), rev'd, 416 S.W.2d 787 (1967).
2 The lotion had been given to Mrs. McKisson by a salesman who was not a party to the
suit.
24 4 0 6 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 416 S.W.2d 779 (1967).
2 id. at 485
2'Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (venue case).
" Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
[Vol. 21
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held not to be a defense to a strict liability action against a distributor."s
However, the doctrines of assumed risk and volenti non fit injuria were
recognized as valid defenses.' In McKisson, privity of contract between
the parties was held unnecesary when a defective and unreasonably danger-
ous product is involved.' The court also quoted with approval from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts: "Contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to dis-
cover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence.""
Thus Texas, by virtue of the Tunks and McKisson cases, has joined the
majority of jurisdictions in applying strict liability to non-food products.
The trend in this direction represents one of the most explosive recent de-
velopments in any area of the law." Because of its new and volatile na-
ture, however, the solutions have not necessarily been uniform, but in-
stead have varied in degree and completeness. For example, several courts
have broken away from the confusing warranty terminology and recog-
nize the concept as one of strict liability in tort." Texas will encounter
new questions which were unanswered by Tunks and McKisson. The Re-
statement and the developed law in those states where strict liability has
been used may indicate the direction Texas courts will take as these ques-
tions appear.
A major area of concern is who among the chain of sellers should be
held liable. The term "seller" in the Restatement means a person regularly
engaged in the business of selling such products; not one who merely
makes an occasional sale. 4 By the expanding case law,' a manufacturer,"
an assembler of parts, 7 a manufacturer of a component part, a retail
28 In n.3 the court states that strict liability in tort can be applied against a distributor as
well as a manufacturer. It compares this with Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370,
251 S.W.2d 153 (1952), where a wholesaler, who dealt with foodstuffs in original con-
tainers was held to be immune from strict liability.
"
5 Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co., v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
25 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
55 1d. at 783-84.
2 Prosser, supra note 8; Wade, supra note 8. While in its formative years, this development was
accurately predicted by Prosser in his now classic article, Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Customer), 69 YALE L.J., 1099 (1960).
" Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17 Sw. L.J.
669 (1963); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963);
see also Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Long v. Flanigan Ware-
house Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965); Prosser, supra note 32; Wade,
supra note 8.
14 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965). A seller includes a manu-
facturer, a wholesale or retail dealer, a distributor, and the operator of a restaurant, The occupa-
tion of the seller need not be silely that of selling such products.
" See Prosser, supra note 8. Although these cases do not all cite § 402A, the defendants in all
of them had been engaged in the business of supplying such goods.
a Prosser, supra note 8.
"
7 Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis,
322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 128 (1964); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
"SMcKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co.,
338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
Contra, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
1967]
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dealer, 9 a wholesale distributor,' and even a lessor of a motor vehicle '
have been held strictly liable. It should be remembered, however, that the
Texas Supreme Court in Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines4 declined to hold
a wholesaler strictly liable for contaminated food sold in original sealed
packages.
The class of persons entitled to use the remedy has also been a problem
in Texas and other states. The Restatement provides that any "user or
consumer" of the product is protected by the strict liability rule 4' Under
the common law development of strict liability" this has been held to
include a final purchaser," the members of his family," his guests,4' 7 his
employees," his lessee, ' and his donee." The plaintiff need not acquire any
interest in the chattel, except "the right to make a lawful use of it.""
Bystanders, therefore, have not been protected.
A third question involves the kind of product which will subject a
seller to strict liability. The test under the Restatement is whether the
product is "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous." A negative defi-
nition of defectiveness is provided: "A product is not in a defective con-
dition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption.""' It is un-
reasonably dangerous when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
" See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Griggs Can-
ning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); cf., e.g., Conner v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1939); Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla.
1965) (non-food products). Contra, Kroger Grocery Co., v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726
(1933). Compare dictum in Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
"o See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Graham
v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
Compare Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
"Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
42 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952).
43RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
"4See generally Prosser, supra note 8. Not all the cases in notes 46-50 infra cite 5 402A.45 
Id.
"Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Labs, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Griggs Canning
Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
4"See, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Tomczuk v. Town of
Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. 1965); Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936
(1964).
"'See, e.g., Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383
S.W.2d 885 (1964); Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54
(1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
"' Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963).
5
°Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945); Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
5' Prosser, supra note 8, at 819.
2 See, e.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc.,
141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div.
2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965). Contra, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85,
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
53RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comment h (1965).
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with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its char-
acteristics."'5 4
Finally, a problem arises if the manufacturer attempts to insulate him-
self from this liability. Disclaimers purporting to limit or eliminate lia-
bility are ineffectual under the Restatement5 and this proposition is sup-
ported by the vast majority of cases, at least when dealing with a manu-
facturer.
II. LIABILITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Remedies. Section 2-314(1) of the Code states, "Unless excluded or
modified ... a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind."5 The most important definition appears in section
2-314(2) (c), which provides that merchantable goods are those which
"are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.""8
This is strikingly similar to the definition of defectiveness under the Re-
statement."
However, a comment to section 2-314 of the Code states that "evidence
indicating that the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or
selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of whether the warranty was
in fact broken."" This language smacks of a negligence theory and is
clearly contrary to the common law development of strict products lia-
bility, for in the latter the seller's negligence is immaterial."' It appears,
however, that, unlike a negligence situation, the burden under the Code
would be on the defendant to prove that he exercised due care.
Section 2-315 provides an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose."a The section is applicable when goods are to be used in the
specific manner required by the plaintiff, as in his business; it does not
encompass usage in an ordinary manner. 5 This warranty arises when the
4 Id. comment i.
" Id. comment in.
56 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961);
Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805
(N.D. 1965); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655, 659-60
(1960); accord, American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying
Florida law). Contra, Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Disclaimers are still generally effective when dealing with a retailer. Prosser, supra note 8, at
833.8 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1).
"'Subsection (2) does not purport to supply the only definition of "merchantable." It does
not preclude other meanings through usage of trade or case law. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-314, Comment 6. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,
3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); Basta v. Riviello, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 718 (C.P. Pa.
1964).
59RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment h (1965).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13.
"s Cases and secondary authority cited note 33 supra.
61 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
" This comes under the merchantability provisions of § 2-314. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-315, Comment 2. McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (§ 2-315
does not encompass general use of a lawninower).
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seller, at the time the contract of sale is made, has reason to know how
the goods are to be used and the buyer relies on the seller's skill and
judgment."
It is unnecessary that the seller have actual knowledge of the contem-
plated use, but the circumstances must be such that he "has reason to
realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists."' The buyer,
however, must actually rely on the seller." The element of reliance is
peculiar to this remedy; " it does not appear either in section 2-314, dealing
with merchantability, or in common law strict liability. In addition,
section 315 does not require that the seller be a merchant with respect to
such goods, although it is generally expected that he will be. "
Privity of Contract. The Code takes a cautious position on the contro-
versial element of privity. Section 2-318 of the official text9 abolishes the
requirement of privity for purposes of the Code's implied warranties when
dealing with injured plaintiffs who are in a horizontal relationship with
the buyer. Thus, people who are in the "family or household" of the buyer
or "guests in his home" are protected if it is reasonable to expect that such
people will use the product in question." For persons other than these,
the Code expresses no opinion as to the need for privity. 1 In addition to
the immediate seller, a plaintiff has also been permitted, in most instances,"
to sue the manufacturer."
64 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. Hart, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Products Liability Law, 20 Bus. LAWYER 173 (1964).
"SUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 1. Appeal of General Elec. Co., 3 U.C.C.
Rep. 510 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bd. of Contract App. 1966) (buyer did not provide
seller with adequate notice of the particular purpose intended); Appeal of Reeves Soundcraft
Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (Armed Services Bd. of Contract App. 1964) (parol evidence ad-
missible to show knowledge on part of seller of particular purpose intended); Mennella v.
Schork, 49 Misc. 2d 449, 267 N.Y.S.2d 428 (5th Dist. Ct. 1966) (supplier of automobile part
for rebuilt engine which had been modified; modification was latent; necessary for plaintiff
to inform supplier of the change).
"Yount v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1963); Standard Packaging
Corp. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1966); McMeekin v. Gimbel
Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Vacuum Concrete Corp. of America' v. Berlanti
Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 548, 214 A.2d 729 (1965); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315,
Comment 1; Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965).
67 The Code makes an innovation by stating that the fact that the product has a trade or
patent name is not itself indicative of nonreliance. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315,
Comment 5.
"Id. Comment 4. Compare text accompanying note 58 supra regarding § 2-314 with Prosser,
supra note 8, at 814.
"ALI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (1963). For
deviations from the official text see Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: The
Need for a Revised Third-Party-Beneficiary Theory in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv.
1028, 1050 (1966).
"°UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE S 2-318. See Rapson, suira note 66. See, e.g., Allen v.
Savage Arms Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 975 (C.P. Pa. 1962) (plaintiff was minor son of buyer);
cf. Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966) (buyer was aunt of deceased child living
next door; child's representative allowed to sue retailer but not distributor or manufacturer)
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
71 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3. Compare Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn.
Supp. 142, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1152 (Super. Ct. 1965), where a bystander was allowed recovery
against a manufacturer.
" In Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966) a recovery was permitted only against
the immediate seller.
'See, e.g., Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn.
1964); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Mitchell v. Miller,
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As enacted in Texas, section 2-318 is even more neutral than that in
the official version:
This Article does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take
advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer
or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty
made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller
for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the
courts for their determination."
Therefore, the importance of the McKisson case" is readily apparent. Its
abolition of the privity requirement greatly expands the scope of both
the common law and the code remedies.
Limitations on Liability. Section 2-316 (2) states that a seller may modify
or even exclude the implied warranty of merchantability by a disclaimer
which mentions the word "merchantability." If the disclaimer is in writing,
it must be conspicuous."' The same may be accomplished as to the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by a writing which is con-
spicuous." Section 1-201 (10) explains:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals . . . is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is
'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. . . Whether
a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court."
However, even though a disclaimer complies with section 2-316(2), a
court may find as a matter of law that it was "unconscionable at the time
it was made" and not enforce it."
Section 2-316 (3) explains more fully when implied warranties may be
26 Conn. Supp. 142, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1152 (Super. Ct. 1965); Rhodes Pharamacal Co. v. Continental
Can Co., 72 I1. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 584 (Ill. App. 1966); Allen v.
Savage Arms Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 975 (C.P. Pa. 1962); Inglis v. American Motor Sales Co., 44
Erie County L.J. 51, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 100 (C.P. Pa. 1961).
4 Tex. Laws (1967) ch. 785, § 2-318.
"Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. McKisson, 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), rev'd, 416 S.W.2d
787 (1967).
7'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2). The reason for this is to reduce oppression
and surprise. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. ll. 1965); Sutter v. St.
Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Il. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963). For examples of effective dis-
claimer clauses, see Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 397 (Ky. App. 1966); Thorman
v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 772 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y. 1965).
" However, "oral language of disclaimer may raise issues of fact as to whether reliance by
the buyer occurred and whether the seller has 'reason to know' under the section on implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2), Comment $.
7Disclaimers were found to be not conspicuous in the following cases: Hunt v. Perkins
Mach. Co., 226 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1967); Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1st Dist. Ct. 1966); Sarnecki v. Johns Pontiac, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1121 (C.P. Pa.
1966); S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (C.P. 1966); Kalodis v. Mayo
Motors, Inc., I U.C.C. Rep. 96 (C.P. Pa. 1963).
7UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1). Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 136-46 (1963); Speidel, The Virginia
"Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L.
REV. 804, 837 (1965). No definition of "unconscionable" appears in the text of § 2-302(1),
but it has been defined as the absence of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and fair dealing.
Freedman, Six Problem Areas of Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
42 CIr.-KENT L. REv. 163, 171 (1965). See, e.g., Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, P.2d
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (disclaimer purported to exempt seller for his own fraud; decided prior
to U.C.C. but result would probably be the same); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d
26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2d Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 300 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1967).
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excluded."0 First, when phrases such as "as is" or "with all faults" or
other clear language of total disclaimer are used, all implied warranties
are deemed to be overcome." Second, when a buyer examines the product
(or a sample or model) as much as he desires or has refused to examine
the product prior to entering into a contract, there is no implied warranty
concerning defects which an examination should have revealed to him. 2
This does not merely mean that the product was available for inspection;
the seller must make a demand that the buyer examine it." Also, "The
particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in
the circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the examina-
tion.""s Latent defects may not be excluded by simple examination.8"
Finally, a course of dealing or a practice in the business can exclude or
modify an implied warranty. 8
Instead of excluding the warranty itself, an agreement between the
buyer and seller may attempt to modify or restrict the remedy for the
breach. Section 2-719 (3) allows consequential damages 7 to be limited or
excluded unless this is unconscionable. A limitation on damages for human
injuries, however, is deemed to be prima facie unconscionable. 8 This ap-
pears to create an incongruity within the Code. If a seller inserts a total
disclaimer of warranty in the contract of sale which complies with section
2-316(2), he may be protected even though the buyer has suffered per-
sonal injuries.8" Yet, if the terms of a contract purport to exclude the
right to recover for personal injuries caused by breach of an implied
warranty, it is presumptively unconscionable and of no effect."
Notice. One further obstacle faces the would-be plaintiff under the Code.
Section 2-607(3) (a) requires that the buyer give notice to the seller
"within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach." If he does not, he is barred from recovery."' A reasonable time
is said to depend upon the "nature, purpose and circumstances."" How-
ever, section 1-204(1) provides that a time may be specified by agree-
ment as long as it is not "manifestly unreasonable." In one case a sale of
8 Subsection (3) is dominant over subsection (2). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
316(3).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3)(a). See, e.g., Willman v. American Motor
Sales Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 100 (C.P. Pa. 1961) (disclaimer must be specific).




"Id. § 2-316(3)(c). See also id. § 1-205.
" Section 2-715(2)(b) defines "consequential damages" to include "injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
88UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-719(3).
"Id. § 2-316(2), (3).
9Id. § 2-719(3). Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J., 199, 280-84
(1963); Speidel, supra note 79, at 838.
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a). Plaintiff's complaint should recite the day
he discovered the breach, the date when notice was given and in what manner (written or oral).
If written, a copy should be attached to the complaint. The complaint should also state
to which officer or agent of the defendant the notice was delivered. Holwka v. York Farm
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 445 (C.P. Pa. 1963).
92UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-204(2).
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defective flower bulbs had been made." The contract of sale stated that
all claims for breach of warranty would be deemed waived unless presented
within eight days after receipt of the bulbs. Long after the eight-day
period, when it was discovered that the bulbs would not flower, the buyer
brought suit. The court held that a limitation which renders warranties
ineffective as to latent defects not discoverable within the limitation period
of the contract is "manifestly unreasonable" and therefore invalid.'
III. COMPARISON OF THE COMMON LAW AND CODE REMEDIES
The common law remedy and the Code impose liability mainly on a
professional who sells defective goods.95 Consequential damages are recover-
able under both. The Code, as enacted in Texas, is strictly neutral as to
the requirement of privity of contract; this is expressly made dependent
upon the developing case law.
It will be remembered that the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires
that a product be "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous," while section
2-314 of the Code calls for "unmerchantable" goods. The definitions of
"defective" and "unmerchantable" are similar, and therefore a plaintiff
suing under the Code is spared from proving the extra requirement that
the product in question was "unreasonably dangerous."
This is a delusive victory for a plaintiff, however, for the Code is
fraught with technical restrictions not found in the common law remedy.
The buyer is required to give notice to the seller of the breach of warranty
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered the
breach. This operates as a trap for the unwary. Also, the Code is seller-
oriented in that the implied warranties may be disclaimed. The Code con-
tains the vestige of a negligence theory in that evidence showing that the
seller exercised care in the preparation of the product is relevant as to
whether a warranty was breached. Finally, an implied warranty may not
exist if the buyer has been invited to examine the product prior to sale
and has failed to uncover defects which he would be expected to find.
One would have to conclude that the common law remedy is generally
more advantageous for a plaintiff than the remedy provided under the
Code. However, in some instances the Code may have definite advantages.
For example, section 2-725 of the Code states that a four-year statute of
limitations applies to actions for breach of implied warranty." This may
be contrasted with the two-year limitations period for personal injury
actions in Texas." However, this longer limitations period under the Code
begins as soon as the seller tenders the defective goods," while under the
93 Q. Vanderberg & Sons v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
94 Id.
"Cf. text accompanying note 68 supra.
In their agreement the parties can reduce the limitations period to not less than one year;
however, they can not extend it beyond four years. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725.
" TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(6) (1958).
98UNIFOR.M COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(2). However, when a warranty applies to future
performance of the goods, the limitations begin to run when the breach is or should have been
found. Id. Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Tower Iron Works, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1054 (1st Cir. 1966);
Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965); Champlain Milk Prods. Inc. v.
M.E. Franks, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 988, 275 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1966).
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common law remedy the two-year period begins only when an injury
occurs." Moreover, under the Code the buyer's lack of knowledge of the
breach of warranty is immaterial!' Thus, the four-year limitations period,
although long, may run easily.
In some situations it may be desirable to characterize an action as one
in contract or as one in tort. For example, a plaintiff anxious to attach
property of the defendant would be wise to frame the action as one in
contract under the Code rather than tort. A Texas statute provides that,
in order to attach property of another, one must allege that the other is
justly indebted to him and must state the amount of the indebtedness.''
This has been construed to mean contract claims, which create a debt of
a sum certain, and to exclude tort claims which do not.' On the other
hand, if one is suing a non-resident, it may be advantageous for the
action to be characterized as tort to obtain service of process under the
long arm statute.' For example, if the contract has been executed and
performed outside the state but the injury has occurred within the state,
a tort suit would allow the application of the long arm statute. Like-
wise, the characterization may prove valuable in a conflict-of-laws situa-
tion."' Finally, the Code allows recovery for commercial loss,' while the.
common law remedy does not.'
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STRICT LIABILITY
Burden of Proof. The use of the term "strict liability" is perhaps un-
fortunate in that the absolute liability of an insurer is implied. It is most
assuredly not that. As seen earlier, strict liability abolishes the need for
privity of contract and relieves the plaintiff from proving that the de-
fendant was negligent. However, a plaintiff is still faced with an arduous
burden of proof."' He must prove that:'..
(1) the product in question was defective (or unmerchantable)
(2) the defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the
defendant;
(3) because of the defect the product was unreasonably dangerous
(this is not required when suing under the Code) ;
O'See, e.g., Stewart v. Janes, 393 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref., cert. denied,
383 U.S. 962 (1966); Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942).
1'°Note 98 supra.
''TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 275(1) (1959).
" Hochstadler Bros. v. Sam, 73 Tex. 315 (1889).
'.
3
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964). Section 4 provides that the defendant
"shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise
with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or
the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State."
' Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code and Recent Developments in Conflict Analysis, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1429 (1966).
'"Rapson, supra note 66, at 692. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
'"Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Prosser,
supra note 8, at 821. Contra, Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
10 Prosser, supra note 32, at 1114.
0' The allegations presented in the text are considered the most important ones. For a more
complete list of suggested allegations see Emroch, Pleading and Proof in a Strict Products Lia-
bility Case, 1966 INs. L.J. 581.
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(4) the defect was the proximate cause of the injury;
(5) he was injured or suffered damages."'
In addition, one suing under the Code should allege and prove that
notice of the breach of warranty has been given to the defendant."' If
an implied warranty for a particular purpose is involved, the defendant's
knowledge of such purpose and the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant
should also be included."1
Defect. A plaintiff must prove that a product was defective or other-
wise unsafe for his use."' This usually requires that the nature of the
defect be established precisely by scientific analysis of the product in
question."' If possible the plaintiff should present testimony yielding direct
evidence of the defect, such as a manufacturing flaw or a faulty design."4
His next best move is to present circumstantial evidence bearing on a
specifically alleged defect in the product."' If these courses are unavailable,
direct evidence of the user and other eyewitnesses as to the product failure
may be sufficient to indicate a defect if supported by expert opinion testi-
mony as to probable causes for the failure."' Finally, by negating other
probable causes, the plaintiff may be able to create an inference of a
defect."'
Defect at Time of Sale. If the defectiveness is proved, the plaintiff
then faces the difficult task of proving that the product was in this faulty
condition when it was sold by the defendant."' He presents the strongest
case when he can offer direct evidence that the product was defective due
to a manufacturing flaw or a faulty design."' In the absence of direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence which creates an inference that a
dangerous condition existed prior to the sale of the product to the plain-
"° Horsley, Products Liability Defenses, 15 DEFENSE L.J. 399 (1966).
"'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-607; Emroch, supra note 108, at 587.
". UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 2-607; Emroch, supra note 108, at 587. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3).
'"For a definition of "defective" under § 402A of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS aee
text accompanying note 55 supra. As to merchantability under § 2-314 of the U.C.C. see text
accompanying note 61 supra.
"' Freedman, Defect in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Product Liability in Tort and in
Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323 (1966); cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
114Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 332
(1967); Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
"'Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"eVandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11'Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
"'See, e.g., U.S. Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963); Sharpe v. Danville
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965); Jack Roach-Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 505 (July 8,
1967); Emroch, supra note 108, at 590; Freedman, supra note 113, at 327; Horsley, supra note
109, at 409; Prosser, supra note 32, at 1114; Prosser, supra note 8, at 841.
"' Emroch, supra note 108, at 590; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California,
18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966).
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tiff is admissible."0 Failing at this, the plaintiff must negate other possible
causes for the malfunction of the product, causes for which the defendant
would not be responsible.12 If the evidence is equal that the defect might
have developed after the product left the control of the defendant, no
liability has been established."0
Unreasonably Dangerous Product. The plaintiff must prove that the
product was unreasonably dangerous. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
would impose liability for a product which is "dangerous to an extent
beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics."'' Thus, the degree of danger necessary is consider-
ably less than ultra-hazardous."4 It has been suggested that a clearer test
would be that of "not reasonably safe." ''2 It will be recalled that federal
courts deciding cases arising in Texas have determined that a defective
wheelchair, from which a wheel became disengaged, " and an aluminum
foil pie pan.. were unreasonably dangerous. Likewise, the Texas Supreme
Court in the McKisson and Tunks cases... has held that a permanent wave
preparation which burns bleached hair and kerosene with a flash point
below the statutory minimum can be unreasonably dangerous.
A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides another test
when dealing with unavoidably unsafe products. 2 ' It calls for a balancing
of the social utility of the dangerous product against its hazards. An
example is the vaccine treatment of rabies which is painful and dangerous
and yet has no real alternative.
Proximate Cause. Plaintiff must show that the defect contained in
the product was a substantial factor in producing his injury." He may do
so in a number of ways: he may be able to show that the defect had been
troublesome before the accident;..1 he may place an expert on the witness
stand to testify as to his opinion concerning the causation;..2 he may
25Prosser, supra note 119. "When it is shown that the product involved comes in a sealed
container, it is inferred that the product reached the consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold." McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
"' McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 39,
at 228-29 (3d ed. 1964).
121Tiffin v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959); Cudahy Pack-
ing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934).
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
124 "Unreasonably dangerous" should not be confused with the term "ultrahazardous." An
older, distinct doctrine of strict tort liability has been imposed upon people who carry out such
extremely dangerous activities as storing large quantities of explosives or keeping wild animals
in captivity. Bateman, supra note 12; W. PROSSER, supra note 121, 55 75-78, at 10-32.125 Wade, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting language usually used in breach-of-warranty cases).
2 Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 198
(1965).
12"Crusan v. Aluminum Co. of America, 250 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Tex. 1965), noted in 20
Sw. L.J. 945 (1966).
121 Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
130Emroch, supra note 108, at 591; Wade, supra note 8, at 22.
... State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449
(1961).
'
32 See, e.g., Kuzma v. U.S. Rubber Co., 323 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961).
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attempt to eliminate other causes. " The plaintiff can also testify as to his
injurious experience in using the product. Perhaps this can be buttressed
by testimony of other eyewitnesses to the injury. Based upon this, an
expert's opinion that any one of several actual, probable, or possible
causes was responsible for the injury would be admissible. " The classic
example of this procedure is the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.1" There the plaintiff testified that while driving her automobile she
heard a loud noise "by the hood" and that it "felt as if something
cracked.". She testified that the steering wheel revolved in her hands
and that the automobile turned sharply off the road. The automobile was
damaged so extensively that subsequent examination did not reveal
whether the steering mechanism had been defective prior to the accident.
The plaintiff produced an eyewitness who testified as to the erratic path
of the automobile at the time in question. This was followed by expert
testimony of an insurance inspector that in his opinion the accident "must
have been due to mechanical defect or failure. 13 The manufacturer and
the dealer were held liable for resulting injuries, despite an extensive clause
in the contract of sale purporting to limit the liability.
It appears that a plaintiff must prove not only that a defect caused his
injury, but also that it was the proximate cause. The test of proximate
cause involves an element of foreseeability-a defendant should not be
liable unless he could have foreseen that his product would cause harm.
A comment to the Uniform Commercial Code states that to be actionable
a breach of warranty must be the proximate cause of the loss sustained.13
Under the common law remedy, the requirement of foreseeability has
been recognized as a factor limiting liability in two types of cases. First,
if the plaintiff is allergic to a product, he must show that he belongs to a
class of people who might have been foreseen to be adversely affected by
the product in question.13" ' A purely individual idiosyncrasy is not fore-
seeable. The second type of case requiring foreseeability arises when the
state of scientific or medical knowledge is limited so that a defendant
could not reasonably have foreseen harm to any user.'" A prime example
1
3
3Paterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116 (1962) (plaintiff proved
that she was free from any allergy).
134Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
"5332 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
" 161 A.2d at 75.
1 7 Id. See also Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-314, Comment 13.
'"See, e.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956) ("not reasonably
foreseeable"); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963) ("substantial portion of possible users"); Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 395 P.2d
1007 (Colo. 1964) ("reasonably foreseeable class of potential users"); Corneliuson v. Arthur Drug
Stores, Inc., 214 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1965) ("appreciable number of people"); Crotty v. Shasten-
berg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960) ("appreciable number"); Esborg
v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) ("reasonably foreseeable and appre-
ciable class or number of potential users").
14Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). Contra, Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See 21 Sw. L.J. 332 (1967).
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of this is a suit by a cancer victim against a manufacturer of cigarettes
prior to the government announcement as to the occurrence of cancer
among smokers. "'
In Texas Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc."' held that proximate
cause is the proper criterion when an uncontaminated drug is involved.
In that case the jury determined that the plaintiff's injuries were an
"abreaction" to a drug manufactured by the defendant.4" The defendant
escaped liability because the plaintiff did not establish that harmful con-
sequences to any appreciable class of users were foreseeable. Indeed, the
state of scientific knowledge was such that the defendant could not reason-
ably have foreseen harm to any user.' "
Foreseeability also comes into play when the plaintiff uses a product
in an unusual manner which the defendant could not be reasonably ex-
pected to foresee.' 4 An abnormal use of a product, therefore, will operate
as a defense in a strict liability suit."
Defenses. If the plaintiff sustains his burden of proof, the defendant may
yet be relieved from liability by asserting a number of possible defenses.
Among these are contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and ab-
normal use of the product. If the suit is predicated upon the implied
warranty provisions of the Code, the defendant may be protected by a
disclaimer in the contract for sale.
Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. The Texas Supreme
Court has already decided that contributory negligence will not serve to
bar recovery in a strict liability suit where the plaintiff's negligence con-
sists of a failure to discover a defect or to guard against the possibility
of its existence.'47 However, the court did indicate that assumption of
risk was a valid defense.''
Other jurisdictions are split as to the validity of contributory negli-
gence as a defense.' Most of the cases which do not allow the defense are
those in which the plaintiff negligently failed to discover the defect in the
product."' On the other hand, most cases which have allowed contributory
"'See Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
'42 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967),
noted in Note, Foreseeability as a Limiting Factor in Applying Strict Products Liability, in this
issue.
143 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). [Editor's Note: There is some confusion as
to the meaning of the term "abreaction." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (1964) gives the
fallowing definition: "in psychoanalysis, the relieving of a repressed emotion, as by talking about it."
As used by the Texas courts it seems to be a hybrid composed of the two words "abnormal" and
"reaction."]
144 Id.
145 Emroch, supra note 108, at 595; Prosser, supra note 8, at 824-25.
" This is discussed more fully in text accompanying notes 155-59 infra.
147 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
14'416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
14 9 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 3:9 (1961).
"0 L. FRUMER & M. FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01 (3) (1960); W. PROSSER, supra
note 121, § 95, at 656-57; Emroch, supra note 108, at 53-94; Prosser, supra note 8, at 838; Prosser,
supra note 32, at 1147; Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and
Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1384 (1966); cf. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 501 (1966).
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negligence as a defense have been ones in which the plaintiff discovered
the defect but nevertheless continued to use the product."' s This actually
comes under the theory of assumption of risk which was accepted as a
defense by the Texas court. 5 ' Prosser reports that, "There are only a few
cases which have recognized the distinction, but it seems quite clear that
it is made in fact.' ' "" Under the Code, however, actual knowledge of a
defect is not required in order to bar liability. Section 2-316 (b) provides
that there is no implied warranty if the buyer examines the product and
fails to detect defects "which an examination ought in the circumstances
to have revealed to him.""M Thus, negligence by the plaintiff at this stage
will preclude recovery under the Code.
Abnormal Use. A product must be reasonably safe for ordinary use.
A defendant, however, is not under a duty to foresee danger created by
an abnormal use which he did not intend.5 Thus, if a plaintiff uses a
deodorant as a mouthwash and is injured thereby, the defendant-manu-
facturer should not be held liable."' But if the use, although unconven-
tional, is not altogether different from that intended, it then becomes a
jury issue as to whether it was so irregular as to bar recovery."' In this
connection, the manufacturer of a grass hula skirt was held strictly liable
for burn injuries resulting from its being worn near a fire. 5 ' For such uses
which are not completely unconventional it has been held that the de-
fendant must at least provide a warning."'
Other Defenses. The intervening conduct of a wholesaler or dealer
might relieve a manufacturer from liability. In one case, an intermediate
seller knew of a danger and gave no warning to the purchaser; the manu-
facturer escaped liability.!ee
If a plaintiff fails to notify a defendant of a defect, this will not bar
... See authorities note 150 supra.
' Rice v. Gulf States Paint Co., 406 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (stating that doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria will bar recovery in implied warranty suit); Tex-Tube, Inc. v. Rockwall
Corp., 379 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See Cruse, supra note 12; authorities cited note 150
supra.
'5 W. PROSSER, supra note 121, S 95, at 657.
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COoE § 2-316(3) (b). See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
"'See, e.g., Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964); Cembrook v. Sterling
Drug Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Magee v. Wyeth Labs,
Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Kaspirowitz v. Schering
Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (App. Div. 1961); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co., Inc.
v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd, 416 S.W.2d 779 (1967); Emroch,
supra note 108, at 595; Prosser, supra note 8, at 824-26; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d $01 (1966); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 402A, comment b (1965).
" Williams v. S.H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955).
"'Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1951); Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932); Ringstad
v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952); Emroch, supra note 108, at 595.
" SBrown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
"'Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964). However, the completely unconventional use should not require a warning.
Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 412 (1963).
'Halpern v. Jad Constr. Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 675, 202 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1960); cf.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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him from recovery according to the common law remedy.'' As pointed
out earlier, however, notice is required under the Code; 12 failure to give
notice within a reasonable time after a plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered a flaw in the product will preclude a later suit for resulting
injuries.'
Disclaimers purporting to limit or eliminate liability are ineffectual
according to the common law remedy, at least when a manufacturer is
involved. " However, the Code allows implied warranties to be dis-
claimed."5 If a seller complies with the express guidelines provided in the
Code, 0 a buyer may be precluded from recourse."'
Finally, if a suit is predicated upon the Code's implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, a seller may offer the defenses that he
did not know of the intended usage or that the buyer did not in fact rely
on the skill and judgment of the seller.'
V. CONCLUSION
The recent extension of the strict liability theory in Texas to encom-
pass non-food products has raised a hue and cry among some defense
attorneys. However, it should be remembered that strict liability means
only that the plaintiff is relieved from proving that privity of contract
existed with the defendant and from proving that the defendant was
negligent. The latter admittedly is somewhat of a boon to the plaintiff;
yet he is still faced with a formidable burden of proof which closely
parallels that in a negligence action. Moreover, if the plaintiff sustains his
difficult burden of proof, the defendant may yet be able to allege an
affirmative defense such as assumption of risk, volenti non fit injuria, or
abnormal use of the product. Strict liability therefore, is in no sense abso-
lute liability.
161 See cases cited supra note 56.
162 See text accompanying note 91 supra.
"'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
164 See notes 55-56 supra.
165 See text accompanying notes 76-90 supra.
16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
167 See note 79 supra.
1 See notes 64-66 supra.
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